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Although insurance companies have been insuring all kinds of products and 
catastrophic events for hundreds of years, cyber insurance, which covers a 
company’s losses and costs stemming from a cyberattack, is a relatively new 
concept.1  Ever the trailblazer in insurance, Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”) was 
one of the first companies to sell coverage for cyber-related incidents in 1999,2 
in what must have seemed then like a blatant attempt to get customers to invest 
in an unnecessary overabundance of caution.  Twenty years later, cyberattacks 
are an everyday occurrence, and a single successful breach can cause an 
organization to incur expenses totaling hundreds of thousands, even millions of 
dollars.3 
With the rising number of successful cyberattacks,4 and businesses 
increasingly turning to their insurance policies to recover their losses,5 it is 
important to understand how insurers are managing the ever-growing number of 
claims.  If cyber insurance policies cover all costs stemming from a breach, and 
                                                          
 1 See Kelly Bissell et al., Ninth Annual Cost of Cybercrime Study, ACCENTURE, 18–19 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-96/accenture-2019-cost-of-
cybercrime-study-final.pdf (listing the different types of cyberattack-related costs, such as 
information loss, cost of business disruption, and cost of equipment damage). 
 2 See Renee Dudley, The Extortion Economy: How Insurance Companies Are Fueling 
a Rise in Ransomware Attacks, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 27, 2019), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-extortion-economy-how-insurance-companies-are-
fueling-a-rise-in-ransomware-attacks (noting that Lloyd’s of London said they “pioneered 
the first cyber liability policy in 1999.”). 
 3 See Shauhin A. Talesh, Data Breach, Privacy, And Cyber Insurance: How Insurance 
Companies Act As “Compliance Managers” For Businesses, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 417, 
426 (2018) (explaining that cyber insurance covers “the liability that flows from the loss,” 
which includes damages to third parties, litigation costs, and the insured’s costs of 
correcting and managing the breach and its economic consequences). 
 4 Adam B. Shniderman, Prove It! Judging the Hostile-or-Warlike-Action Exclusion in 
Cyber-Insurance Policies, 129 YALE L.J. F. 64, 84 (2019). 
 5 See Andrew Granato & Andy Polacek, The Growth and Challenges of Cyber 
Insurance, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. (2019), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/ 
chicago-fed-letter/2019/426 (noting the increasing number of businesses purchasing cyber 
insurance to cover cyber incident costs). 
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companies report additional losses every year, can traditional insurance business 
models continue to offset the threats?6  How much longer before a massive 
cyberattack deals a catastrophic blow to a major insurer?7  How do we ensure 
the cyber insurance policy’s survival when we have missed the writing on the 
wall?8 
Section II of this article will discuss the problems currently facing the cyber 
insurance industry and address whether or not the current model is adequate and 
sustainable in the long term.  Section III will discuss the conflicting claims as 
seen through the lens of the insurance companies, their customers, and industry 
analysts.  Section IV will set out the various past legal responses to the increase 
in cyber insurance claims.  Section V will discuss future trends in this area, and 
an assessment in Section VI of the past legal responses will show that these will 
not successfully deal with what is expected of the current cyber insurance 
framework.  To that end, Section VII will propose solutions to this quandary. 
I. CYBER CRIMES ARE HERE TO STAY, BUT WHAT ABOUT CYBER 
INSURANCE? 
Once upon a time in the not so distant past, paper was king.  Businesses 
recorded their transactions on paper, organizations recorded information on 
paper, and everything from plane tickets to photographs to medical records was 
printed on paper.  Generating, filing, storing, and retrieving all those paper 
records was laborious, time-consuming, and space-consuming.  However, the 
advent of the computer has virtually eliminated everything that made record-
keeping expensive and cumbersome, and today computers dominate the day-to-
day operations of every business.9  In fact, computer technology has quickly 
permeated every other part of our day-to-day lives as well.  Computers are the 
                                                          
 6 See Peter Manchester, Why Insurance Business Models Are Going to Change, EY 
(Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.ey.com/en_us/innovation-in-insurance/why-insurance-
business-models-are-going-to-change (describing traditional insurance models, such as 
investing in multiple channels and profiting off distribution networks). 
 7 See Denise Matthews, 2019 Report on the Cybersecurity Insurance and Identity Theft 
Coverage Supplement, NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS 1 (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Cyber_Supplement_2019_Report_ 
Final%20%281%29.pdf (explaining how insurers face “cybersecurity attacks in their daily 
operations” and noting that cybercriminals are interested in “obtaining personal information 
for financial gain”). 
 8 See David L. Vicevich, The Case for a Federal Cyber Insurance Program, 97 NEB. L. 
REV. 555, 577 (2018) (observing that recent statistics point to the cybersecurity industry 
greatly exceeding the insurance market’s capacity). 
 9 See Aman Goel, 10 Best Programming Languages to Learn in 2020 (for Job & 
Future), HACKR.IO, https://hackr.io/blog/best-programming-languages-to-learn-2020-jobs-
future (last updated Sept. 14, 2020) (noting that computers “have entered every industry” 
and are extremely beneficial for organizing and accessing personal information). 
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way we communicate, conduct business, shop, and even date, sparing us the 
inconvenience of dealing with paper documents and providing a way to store 
data someplace where it can be readily accessed at any time of the day from 
practically anywhere.10 
These advancements come at a cost.  The more activities we control with 
technology and the internet, the greater our reliance on them.11  Coupled with 
the massive amounts of data stored by the technology we use, there is increasing 
potential for risk of a cyberattack, defined as a deliberate and malicious act 
intended to harm an organization’s critical IT infrastructure, often through the 
internet.12  The economic consequences of a cyberattack can be extensive: 
businesses often must repair or replace equipment and pay for additional labor 
and company downtime; upgrade cybersecurity programs and equipment; cover 
consultant fees; and even pay hefty regulatory penalties for failing to protect 
confidential information to comply with data breach reporting requirements or 
to implement required privacy or security measures.13  In addition, major data 
breaches often spur costly litigation and cross-litigation between multiple parties 
due to inherent interdependencies, which adds to burgeoning costs on all sides.14  
For example, health insurer Anthem suffered a data breach in 2015 that led to a 
                                                          
 10 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 604 (explaining that the fast-paced developments in 
telecommunications and the internet that made them so successful also made them 
insecure). 
 11 See Talesh, supra note 3, at 418 (explaining that as consumer, financial, and health 
information are increasingly stored in electronic form, the potential for cybersecurity 
breaches also increases); see also Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 8 (noting that “[f]ewer than 
one in four companies relied on the Internet for their business operations 10 years ago; now, 
it is 100 percent.”). 
 12 See AMOS N. GUIORA, CYBERSECURITY: GEOPOLITICS, LAW AND POLICY 17 
(Routledge ed., 2017); see also Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 6–10 (defining cyberattacks as, 
“malicious activity conducted against the organization through the IT infrastructure via the 
internal or external networks, or the Internet”). 
 13 See SCOTT M. SEAMAN & JASON R. SCHULZE, ALLOCATION OF LOSSES IN COMPLEX 
INS. COVERAGE CLAIMS § 17:4 (2019) (explaining that policies may cover losses from 
cyberattacks as well as civil lawsuits and regulatory investigations and actions); see also 
Devlin Barrett, Capital One Fined $80 Million for 2019 Hack of 100 Million Credit Card 
Applications, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/capital-one-fined-2019-hack/2020/08/06/90c2c836-d7f3-11ea-aff6-
220dd3a14741_story.html (citing an $80 million fine that Capital One is to pay U.S. 
regulators over a 2019 hacking incident where approximately 100 million credit card 
applications were illegally accessed). 
 14 See Toni Scott Reed, Cybercrime and Technology Losses: Claims and Potential 
Insurance Coverage for Modern Cyber Risks, 54 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 153, 163 
(2019) (noting that certain cyberattacks often lead to class action lawsuits that require 
extensive litigation and can result in excessive damages); see Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578 
(discussing the total estimated damages for the WannaCry, Love Bug, Target, and Anthem 
cybersecurity breaches). 
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$115 million class action settlement.15  Retailer Target estimated that the now-
infamous breach of 2013 cost them almost $300 million, including nearly $89 
million in settlements alone.16  Further, in 2017, pharmaceutical giant Merck’s 
operations were crippled by the NotPetya malware, ultimately resulting in $1.3 
billion in losses.17 
Similarly, smaller companies are not spared. The impact of cyberattacks 
continues to grow exponentially: the average amount a U.S. business loses due 
to a data breach has grown from $3.54 million in 2006 to $8.19 million in 2019.18  
Annual costs in the U.S. run in the billions, but on a global scale, businesses 
stand to lose over $5.2 trillion over the next five years due to cybercrimes.19  
This is indeed a worrying trend—these kinds of figures can threaten an 
organization’s very survival—and today’s reports show that cyberattacks are 
becoming increasingly frequent and more sophisticated over time.20  Businesses 
in 2019 are nearly one-third more likely to suffer a cybersecurity breach than 
they were in 2014.21  As a result, those that have fallen victim to such attacks 
have started turning to their insurance companies for coverage against losses,22 
as well as for guidance on how to improve their cybersecurity efforts and how 
to respond when a cyberattacker demands a ransom.23  Premiums for cyber 
policies in the US grew from $1.8 billion in 2017 to $2 billion in 2018, more 
than double of what was reported in 2015.24  In recent years the number of 
                                                          
 15 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578. 
 16 Vincent Lynch, Cost of 2013 Target Data Breach Nears $300 Million, HASHED OUT 
(May 26, 2017), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/2013-target-data-breach-settled/ 
(detailing settlements: $10 million to consumers, $19 million to Mastercard, $39.4 million 
to financial institutions, and $18.5 to state governments). 
 17 Riley Griffin et al., Was It an Act of War? That’s Merck Cyber Attack’s $1.3 Billion 
Insurance Question., BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
national/2019/12/03/550039.htm. 
 18 IBM, COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT 10 (2019), https://www.ibm.com/ 
downloads/cas/RDEQK07R. 
 19 Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 14. 
 20 See Shniderman, supra note 4, at 84 (describing the growing sophistication and 
frequency of cyberattacks); see also Talesh, supra note 3, at 418 (asserting that 
cybersecurity breaches can threaten an organization’s very survival). 
 21 COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 18, at 11, 15.  This annual report is 
conducted by the Ponemon Institute and sponsored by IBM Security.  Id.  It analyzes data 
breach costs reported by 507 organizations across 16 geographies and 17 industries, during a 
period from July 2018 to Apr. 2019.  Id. 
 22 See Shauhin A. Talesh, Insurance Companies as Corporate Regulators: The Good, 
The Bad, and The Ugly, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 475 (2017) (noting that organizations are 
increasingly purchasing insurance to cover cyber threats). 
 23 See Dudley, supra note 2 (describing the advisory role insurance companies often 
take in cyber extortion incidents). 
 24 Yotam Gutman, Cyber Insurance Is No Substitute For Robust Cybersecurity Systems, 
SENTINELONE (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/cyber-insurance-is-no-
substitute-for-robust-cybersecurity-systems/# (stating that AIG cyber-insurance claims 
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insurers who offer cyber insurance has steadily risen.25 
Adding to the precarious outlook for cyber insurers, the COVID-19 global 
pandemic wreaked havoc across the world in just a matter of months.26  
Businesses, government bodies, schools, and entire industries had to hastily 
convert to fully online operations, which forced millions of people to work, 
study, socialize, worship, and perform every other activity online using often-
inadequate technology, such as their home computers.27  The pandemic’s 
damage to the cyber insurance industry is two-fold.  First, the hasty restructuring 
of organizations’ IT infrastructures has led to weakened cybersecurity, creating 
a landscape ripe for cyberattackers.28  Researchers have found that between 
January and March 2020, the number of organizations compromised by a 
cyberattack in the U.S. and across Europe increased two, three, and even four-
fold in some places.29 
Second, the rapidly growing number of insurance claims and lawsuits against 
insurance companies for pandemic-related claims—101 in U.S. federal courts as 
of May 2020—threatens to significantly weaken the insurance industry’s 
solvency.30  For example, the Wimbledon tennis tournament is set to receive a 
                                                          
nearly doubled between 2017 and 2018); State of the Cyber Insurance Market— Top 
Trends, Insurers and Challenges: A.M. Best, AM BEST (June 18, 2019), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/06/18/529747.htm. 
 25 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 587 (noting that cyber insurance is now offered by over 
500 competing insurers); see also State of the Cyber Insurance Market, supra note 24. 
 26 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46270, GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COVID-19 
(2020) (explaining that since the first diagnosis in late 2019, the virus has spread to over 200 
countries, sickening more than 16.4 million people—a quarter of them in the U.S.—with 
nearly 650,000 fatalities).  More than 80 countries have closed their borders to travelers 
from countries with infections, ordered businesses to close, instructed their populations to 
self-quarantine, and shut down schools to an estimated 1.5 billion children.  Id. 
 27 Hacking Against Firms Surges as Workers Take Computers Home, REUTERS (Apr. 
17, 2020), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200417/NEWS06/ 
912334100?template=printart. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Arctic Security and Team Cymru Reveal Number of Compromised Organizations Has 
More Than Doubled Since Stay-at-Home Order, ARCTIC SECURITY (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://arcticsecurity.com/news/2020/04/20/arctic-security-and-team-cymru-reveal-number-
of-compromised-organizations-has-more-than-doubled-since-stay-at-home-order/ (reporting 
that the number of affected organizations “doubled, tripled or even quadrupled” in the first 
quarter of 2020); see Hacking Against Firms Surges as Workers Take Computers Home, 
supra note 27. 
 30 See Emma Cueto, COVID-19 Accelerating Growth of Class Action Cases, LAW360 
(July 8, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1289937/covid-19-accelerating-growth-of-
class-action-cases (noting that around twenty-five percent of the 560 current pandemic-
related class action lawsuits are against insurance companies); see also Jim Sams, Number 
of Federal COVID-19 Business Interruption Lawsuits at 101 and Rising, CLAIMS J. (May 
21, 2020), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2020/05/21/297180.htm# 
(explaining that experts believe “forcing insurers to pay such claims would undermine the 
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$142 million payout from its insurer for the cancellation of the 2020 tournament 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.31  In France, a court ordered insurer AXA to 
pay two months’ worth of pandemic-related revenue losses to a restaurant, seen 
by many as the tip of the iceberg for business-loss claims.32  In the US, some 
courts have sided with plaintiffs in their claims against insurers for COVID-
related losses.33  Legal and accounting professionals are now encouraging 
businesses to file claims for losses stemming from the pandemic, regardless of 
policy language or laws seemingly favoring insurers.34  In May 2020, U.S. 
business losses were estimated to be between $393 and $668 billion per month; 
even paying out a fraction of those amounts could severely undermine an 
insurer’s ability to respond to major cyber insurance claims.35 
With the average cyber claim payout reaching six figures, total costs of 
recovery totaling at seven or even eight figures, and the surge of cyberattacks, 
insurers have begun to rein in payouts through a variety of methods, such as 
selling policies that cover only specific cyber events, employing exclusionary 
language, and focusing on human error and intervening events to disqualify 
coverage.36  Unlike other types of insurance policies, such as those for property 
and liability, cyber risk policies are not standardized in format or language; they 
can vary greatly depending on the insurer and the insured.37  There are some 
                                                          
solvency of the industry”). 
 31 Wimbledon Shows How Pandemic Insurance Could Become Vital for Sports, Other 
Events, GLOBALDATA (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
international/2020/04/13/564598.htm. 
 32 Bruce Brumberg, Covid-19 Business Losses Covered By Insurance: Lawyers And 
CPAs Advise You To File Claim Now, FORBES (May 26, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/brucebrumberg/2020/05/26/covid-19-business-losses-covered-by-insurance-lawyers-
and-cpas-advise-you-to-file-claim-now/#21d7e8935eb8. 
 33 Kenneth M. Gorenberg and Scott N. Godes, Update on Business Interruption 
Insurance Claims for COVID-19 Losses, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 29, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/update-business-interruption-insurance-claims-covid-
19-losses (citing favorable rulings for plaintiffs in COVID coverage disputes in North 
Carolina, Florida, Philadelphia, and Dallas). 
 34 Brumberg, supra note 32; see Bethan Moorcraft, A Plaintiff Attorney’s View on 
COVID-19 Business Interruption Claims, INS. BUS. AM. (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/a-plaintiff-attorneys-view-
on-covid19-business-interruption-claims-224422.aspx. 
 35 Sams, supra note 30 (explaining that experts believe “forcing insurers to pay such 
claims would undermine the solvency of the industry”). 
 36 See Reed, supra note 14, at 168 (explaining that standard insurance policies do not 
specifically cover cyber events, and coverage might have to be determined by court 
interpretation of policy language); see also Griffin et al., supra note 17 (discussing AIG’s 
refusal to cover client Merck’s claim due to the “war exclusion” in their policy); Gutman, 
supra note 24 (noting that insurers can cite human error to refuse payouts). 
 37 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13 (explaining that cyber policies vary from 
insurer to insurer and policy to policy); see also Reed, supra note 14, at 176 (observing that 
cyber policies generally do not have standard form, terms, or provisions). 
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common exclusions, such as exclusions for willful, intentional, and criminal acts 
by employees; exclusions for patent and trade secrets; and exclusions for breach 
of contract.38  For example, the Merck breach highlights an exclusion found in 
many cyber insurance policies: the hostile-or-warlike exclusion, which exempts 
the insurer from covering losses when the nature of the cyberattack was “war-
like” and initiated by a state actor.39  In the aftermath of the NotPetya attacks, 
the White House announced that the perpetrator had been the Russian military, 
the intended target Ukraine, and that victims like Merck were collateral 
damage.40  When Merck presented claims to its thirty insurers, they were denied 
coverage under the act of war exclusion, which set off a series of lawsuits still 
pending in the courts.41 
Another provision found in some cyber policies excludes losses not directly 
resulting from computer use.42 This provision leaves companies high and dry 
when their employees are victims of “spoofing,” where attackers use legitimate-
looking email addresses and websites to gain entry into the organization’s 
system or to trick an employee into performing a money transfer,43 and 
“phishing,” where the attackers send phony email messages with clickable links 
that give them access to the system.44  When employees at Apache Corporation, 
an oil production company, were tricked into wiring millions to Latvian hackers, 
their insurance company GAIC denied coverage due to the transfer of funds not 
being a direct result of computer use, but instead the result of a multi-step fraud 
process.45  The Fifth Circuit agreed.46  In an example of smaller organizations 
finding themselves in similar situations, a Virginia court ruled that a real estate 
company’s wiring of $42,000 to a fraudster violated a “voluntary parting” 
exclusion in their cyber policy and therefore was not entitled to coverage by their 
insurer.47  As grim as the outlook is on the future of cyber threats, insurers will 
likely continue to seek ways to limit their exposure.48 
                                                          
 38 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13. 
 39 Shniderman, supra note 4, at 65. 
 40 Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (noting the increasing number of businesses 
purchasing cyber insurance to cover cyber incident costs). 
 41 Griffin et al., supra note 17. 
 42 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13. 
 43 Reed, supra note 14, at 198. 
 44 Id. at 156–57. 
 45 Apache Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252, 258–59 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 46 Id. at 252. 





 48 See infra pp. 10–11 and notes 58–59. 
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But will it be enough?  Hackers and hacker groups seem to be growing in 
numbers, even organizing to support each other and offer their services to the 
general public.49  This trend is likely to continue: experts note that cybercrimes 
generally have high profit margins, while the risk of detection or prosecution is 
very low.50  Virtually every major industry is affected by cybersecurity breaches, 
from the business sector to government agencies; no private or public entity is 
safe.51  In fact, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has 
reported that cybercrime is “progressing at an incredibly fast pace, with new 
trends constantly emerging.”52  Among these trends is the availability of 
ransomware53 packages for easy purchase online, where any buyer may 
subscribe to an online service that creates the malware and even offers service 
support to help coordinate the attacks and ransom payments.54 
Moving forward, insurers whose positions have been weakened by the 
proliferation of cyberattacks, and subsequent insurance claims, will be 
vulnerable given the inevitability of the next large-scale attack. Analysts predict 
it could cost businesses as much as $193 billion in immediate and long-term 
costs.55  Today, a cataclysmic accumulation of claims by multiple insured 
customers, like what occurred with the WannaCry and NotPetya malwares in 
2017 and 2018 respectively, could be a coup de grâce for some insurers.56  So, 
what could ensure an adequate and sustainable cyber insurance industry to 
respond to the surging incidence of cyberattacks?57 
                                                          
 49 See Drake Bennett, The Time I Sabotaged My Editor with Ransomware from the Dark 
Web., BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2020-dark-web-
ransomware/ (describing the dark web chatrooms that function as both forums for hackers 
and bazaars for malware sellers and buyers). 
 50 Reed, supra note 14, at 160. 
 51 Talesh, supra note 3, at 418 (noting that the industries that have been attacked include 
the financial, health care, retail, entertainment, and insurance industries). 
 52 Cybercrime, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Cybercrime (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2021). 
 53 Bennett, supra note 49 (defining ransomware as “[m]alicious software that encrypts 
data on a computer or server . . . allow[ing] an attacker to extort a payment in exchange for 
the decryption key”). 
 54 Id. (describing the dark-web chatrooms that function as both forums for hackers and 
bazaars for malware sellers and buyers). 
 55 Najiyya Budaly, Lloyd’s To Phase In ‘Silent’ Cyber-Cover Guard By July 2021, 
LAW360 (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1239018/lloyd-s-to-phase-in-
silent-cyber-cover-guard-by-july-2021. 
 56 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 578, 603 (asserting that the current cyber insurance market 
is not self-sustaining and will require a federal reinsurer for major cyber events); but see 
Ran Levi, What’s the Problem with Cyber Insurance?, MALICIOUS LIFE, 
https://malicious.life/episode/episode-64/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (contending that cyber 
insurance is sustainable because insurers are able to spread the risk, as well as adequately 
assess their insureds’ cyber defenses). 
 57 See infra Section VII. 
120 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY [Vol. 29.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
II. CONFLICTING CLAIMS 
A. Insurance Companies: The Cyber Insurance Boom 
Insurance is a risk-distribution mechanism by which the insurer pools the 
risks of multiple insureds and uses their premiums to pay out claims.58  Lloyd’s, 
for example, currently offers its cyber coverage through ninety-three syndicates 
that provide the necessary capital responsible for accepting and spreading the 
risk.59  Insurers can add an additional layer of protection with reinsurance, 
offered by companies who will also assume some of the insurer’s financial 
risk.60  The risk-spreading, coupled with the increasing demand for cyber 
polices, have made cyber insurance profitable;61 in the U.S., for every dollar in 
premiums collected, roughly thirty-five cents is paid out in claims, considerably 
better than the average sixty-two cents paid out on property and casualty 
claims.62  However, because the costs of cyber claims are rising and can quickly 
become excessive,63 insurers are employing mitigating tactics, such as payout 
limits, coverage limits, high premiums and deductibles, and tighter policy 
language.64  In addition, some insurers have begun denying claims due to 
“employee negligence,” which is involved in around 59 percent of all 
cybersecurity breaches.65 
Insurance companies have also pointed to the need for businesses to properly 
assess and reduce their risk of a successful cyberattack.66  Studies have shown 
there is an inverse correlation between the level of cybersecurity deployed by a 
company and the cost of a data breach.67  For example, a recent study showed 
that the average cost of a data breach was 95 percent higher for companies 
relying solely on human intervention for cybersecurity, than for companies using 
                                                          
 58 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 581. 
 59 The Lloyd’s Market, LLOYD’S, https://www.lloyds.com/about-lloyds/what-is-
lloyds/the-lloyds-market (last visited Feb. 23, 2021). 
 60 Bethan Moorcraft, Facultative and Treaty Reinsurance: What’s the Difference?, INS. 
BUS. AM. (June 3, 2019), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/guides/facultative-and-
treaty-reinsurance-whats-the-difference-168929.aspx. 
 61 See Gutman, supra note 24 (noting that the loss ratio for cyber policies had dropped 
to as low as 32 percent in 2017, making them very profitable for insurers). 
 62 Dudley, supra note 2. 
 63 Talesh, supra note 22, at 474–75. 
 64 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 581, 587–88 (noting the high cost of cyber policies, which 
will likely continue to rise due to increased regulation and class action lawsuits); see The 
Lloyd’s Market, supra note 59 (noting the high cost of cyber policies, which will likely 
continue to rise due to increased regulation and class action lawsuits). 
 65 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 589. 
 66 See infra Section VII.B.i. 
 67 See COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT, supra note 18, at 59. 
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automated security methods and technologies.68  Because a robust cybersecurity 
program is critical to limit a company and its insurer’s exposure, some insurers 
require their larger clients employ modern, comprehensive cybersecurity plans. 
Failure to comply with these recommendations is grounds for refusal to pay out 
claims.69  Unfortunately, many organizations lack the foresight to adequately 
prepare against a cyberattack, either believing one to be unlikely, or 
underestimating the potential cost.70  With insurers now offering variations of 
cyber policies that cover many types of events and pay out claims for all kinds 
of expenses,71 a client’s ineffective risk management is detrimental to both 
insured and insurer.72  Insurance companies, however, believe this is a storm 
they can weather with their current framework.73 
B. Analysts: We Are Sitting on a Powder Keg 
Some experts have questioned whether cyber risk is even insurable and 
whether insurers can continue to underwrite these policies due to the unique 
nature of cyber threats.74  First, the threats change as quickly as technology 
advances and cyberattacks evolve.75  This denies insurance companies the kinds 
of historical patterns and relatively consistent risk profiles they rely on to 
properly assess risks.76  Second, cyber incidents can be caused by several events, 
such as cybercrime, human error, war, terrorism, and natural disasters.77  Due to 
the interconnected nature of businesses and technology, one cyberattack could 
affect multiple companies simultaneously and lead to large interrelated losses 
the insurer must cover.78  Third, cyberattacks tend to unleash a cache of financial 
consequences that other types of policies would not normally cover.79  For 
                                                          
 68 Id. at 58. 
 69 Gutman, supra note 24. 
 70 GUIORA, supra note 12, at 24. 
 71 Reed, supra note 14, at 170. 
 72 See Dudley, supra note 2 (noting that insurers assess a policyholder’s cybersecurity, 
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 73 See LLOYD’S, 20 SUPERBRANDS U.K. ANN. 74, 75 (2019) (contending that Lloyd’s 
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 74 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 591 (questioning whether cyber risk is even insurable). 
 75 Id. at 563. 
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 77 Vicevich, supra note 8, at 563. 
 78 Granato & Polacek, supra note 5. 
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example, due to the proliferation of cyberattacks and data breaches, states have 
begun passing data protection regulations that impose costly penalties on 
companies that have suffered a data breach, with at least two states allowing for 
class action lawsuits.80  With data flowing across state lines and businesses 
operating across the nation, the potential for losses in legal costs alone is 
staggering.81  Factor in stringent European Union data privacy laws that 
prescribe potentially astounding penalties for breaches,82 and the damages an 
insurer would need to cover could be catastrophic,83 prompting many to believe 
cyber coverage is simply not sustainable.84 
Another challenge experts note about the rising use of cyber insurance is that 
it inadvertently contributes to the increasing number of cyberattacks, which in 
turn prompts companies to seek out new or more expensive cyber policies.85  A 
clear example of this is ransomware, which is malicious software that an attacker 
uses to lock a victim out of their files.86  The attacker then demands payment, 
                                                          
data breach can result in costly fines for a company, as well as lawsuits filed by private 
individuals if the company fails to comply with state notification requirements). 
 80 See Carla Llaneza, An Analysis on Biometric Privacy Data Regulation: A Pivot 
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(discussing a recent expansion in data privacy laws, regulations, and industry guidelines). 
 81 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 87 (explaining that increased regulation and successful 
class action lawsuits will drive up the costs of cyber events); see also Talesh, supra note 3, 
at 418 (stating that the enactment of data protection laws coupled with the flow of data 
across state lines make compliance with all regulations very difficult for companies 
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 82 See Mohammed Murad, How Biometrics Complement GDPR Regulations, IRIS ID 
(June 3, 2019), https://www.irisid.com/home-biometrics-complement-gdpr-regulations/ 
(discussing the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, under which non-
compliance can result in penalties of up to €20 million or 4 percent of a company’s annual 
worldwide revenue, whichever is greater). 
 83 See Josephine Wolff, Time for Regulators to Take Cyber Insurance Seriously, 
LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/time-regulators-take-cyber-
insurance-seriously (describing the fear that “a large-scale cyberattack could affect so many 
customers simultaneously that insurers would be unable to pay out all the necessary 
claims”); cf. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity With 
Cyberinsurance Markets And Better Risk Assessment, 102 MINN. L. REV. 191, 238 (2017) 
(“While there is a potential for catastrophic cyberattacks, most cyberattacks will not rise to 
that level, yet the risk is still significant because the probability for a less-severe event is 
very high.”). 
 84 See Wolff, supra note 83 (listing all of the challenges facing the cyber insurance 
market and proposing several solutions needed to stabilize it). 
 85 See Dudley, supra note 2 (arguing that cyber insurance is both fueling and benefitting 
from cyberattacks). 
 86 Bennett, supra note 49. 
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usually in cybercurrency, and threatens to disclose the organization’s sensitive 
information or prevent access to the organization’s files and website.87  These 
attacks are perpetrated by individuals or groups who have usually studied their 
victims and know about the critical nature of their data, their financial situations, 
and whether they have cyber insurance.88  Public organizations, such as hospitals 
and city government offices, are often targeted because they tend to have fewer 
defense systems and a higher incentive to quickly recover the data that has been 
highjacked by cyberattackers.89  When the attackers demand a ransom, its 
payment is often covered by the victim’s cyber policy.90 
Many people would be shocked to learn that insurers are increasingly 
approving, and even recommending, the payment of ransom; insurers claim that 
limiting breach costs by quickly restoring operations makes financial sense for 
all involved.91  Analysts argue that the six and seven-figure ransom payments 
insurers are covering have led to a steady rise in ransomware attacks and higher 
extortion amounts, which in turn leads to increased demand for cyber insurance 
by frightened customers.92  Without even considering the ethical concerns of 
what essentially amounts to rewarding cybercrime,93 analysts believe that this 
model cannot be sustained.94  Yesterday’s hackers and their malware are 
                                                          
 87 Reed, supra note 14, at 158. 
 88 See Dudley, supra note 2 (noting the high likelihood that hackers specifically extort 
companies that have cyber insurance); see also Targeted Ransomware Attacks: The Easy 
Choice For Cybercriminals, PANDA (July 5, 2019), 
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 90 Dudley, supra note 2. 
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 92 Id. 
 93 See id. (“The FBI and security researchers say paying ransoms contributes to the 
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regimes.”); see also Wolff, supra note 83 (stating that with respect to cyber insurance 
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 94 See DAC Beachcroft, Insurance Wordings Predictions 2020, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 4, 
2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=52362ade-b38a-40d5-a53e-
eda51642eedf (questioning whether continued payment of cyber extortion without 
government intervention is sustainable and arguing that the situation will become more 
serious over time). 
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replaced with the next wave of hackers with new malware95 seeking more 
victims, demanding higher compensation, and attacking bigger fish: large, often 
public enterprises with a multi-state or global presence.96  This ransom spree has 
led to an average ransomware payout of $41,198 at the end of 2019 (six times 
higher than in 2018), with some payouts well over the million-dollar mark.97 
There are also claims that although the cyber insurance market is growing, 
the frequency, impact, and cost of successful cyberattacks will outpace and 
eventually overwhelm the current framework.98 Insurers are legally required to 
have enough liquidity to be able to pay out all potential future claims on every 
policy they have written.99  To satisfy regulators that it is financially capable of 
paying its policyholders’ claims, an insurer can obtain reinsurance to assume 
part of the risk.100  Some researchers, however, claim that insurers fear the 
likelihood of a “Cybergeddon” event, a breach of such massive scale that it 
would cause a “critical information infrastructure breakdown,” resulting in 
hundreds of billions of dollars in damages in just days.101  Were such an event 
to come on the heels of another catastrophic event, such as a global pandemic or 
a massive earthquake, the resulting multitude of claims could potentially 
devastate the entire insurance industry.102  It is true that the insurance industry 
                                                          
 95 See Bennett, supra note 49 (describing ransomware GandCrab, used by hackers to 
extract $2 billion during a period of fifteen months, which was “retired” and replaced by 
subsequent ransomware). 
 96 See Targeted Ransomware Attacks: The Easy Choice for Cybercriminals, supra note 
88 (describing the 2018 ransomware attack on Norsk Hydro, which crippled 22,000 
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 98 See Pramod Borasi, Cyber Insurance Market Expected to Reach $28.6 Billion by 
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 101 Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 237 (discussing policy makers’ concerns about the 
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 102 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (expanding on the idea that cyberattacks like 
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has learned much about risk spreading since the days when catastrophic events, 
such as Hurricane Andrew in 1992, would wipe out insurers almost overnight.103  
But insurance experts point out that if cyber risk is not brought under control, 
there may be fewer and fewer underwriters who will assume the risk to enable 
the existence of a cyber insurance market.104 
III. PAST LEGAL RESPONSES 
A. The First International Regime: The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime 
In 2001, the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe convened 
in Budapest, which resulted in the first international treaty on cybercrimes, 
known as the Budapest Convention.105 Its principal goals were to pursue 
common policy through legislation and international cooperation in order to 
protect society against crimes committed through the internet and other 
computer networks.106  The Budapest Convention calls on states to criminalize 
a list of actions involving computer system access or private data interception; 
provides procedural tools and safeguards to be used in the investigation of a 
cybercrime; and creates international cooperation on cybercrime and electronic 
evidence.107  This treaty remains the most important step toward a transnational 
criminal law for cybercrimes, providing a useful framework that defines cyber 
offenses, their prevention, and their prosecution.108  Supporters argue this has 
resulted in stronger and more uniform legislation, trusted partnerships between 
signatories, and better investigation and prosecution of cyber offenses, all of 
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Challenges, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 191, 217 (2018). 
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which contribute to human rights and the rule of law in cyberspace.109  To date, 
sixty-two countries, including the U.S., have ratified the treaty.110 
For insurers that cover cyber incidents, the Budapest Convention is still the 
most relevant and internationally acknowledged set of guidelines on what 
constitutes a cybercrime.111  In addition, the Convention is dynamic in nature, 
with follow-up mechanisms that provide valuable feedback that contributes to 
the evolution of the convention.112  Insurers looking to gauge the prevalence and 
scope of emerging cyber activities, and assess the risk on a regional or global 
scale, can turn to the Budapest Convention for some guidance in these areas.113 
B. The Response at Home 
1. The Federal Level 
In 1984, the U.S. federal government enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (“CFAA”), which penalizes anyone who intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization and obtains data or knowingly transmits data that results 
in intentional harm to a protected computer. 114  This legislation sought to strike 
a balance between the federal government’s interest in prosecuting criminal 
activity involving computers and the interests of the states to criminalize and 
punish those offenses.115  Cybercrimes were in their infancy at that time, but as 
they grew more sophisticated, Congress responded with amendments expanding 
jurisdiction by closing loopholes, broadening the scope of the law, and 
criminalizing new activities.116 
Recognizing the rising cyber-threat level and potential for damage, Congress 
passed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which focused on two principal issues: 
(1) the importance of information sharing between the government and the 
private sector in order to prevent and combat cyber threats and (2) the acceptable 
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monitoring for the purpose of protection from cyberthreats.117  In 2018, the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act shifted the nation’s 
cybersecurity policy strategy from defensive to offensive; the U.S. would now 
use preemptive cyber operations to deter adversaries.118  No doubt the U.S. 
government’s increasing focus on cybersecurity is one of the key factors insurers 
consider when drafting their cyber policies. 
2. The State Level 
Insurers also look to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”), a state-created regulatory board that sets standards, establishes best 
practices, and conducts oversight of the insurance industry.119  The goal of the 
NAIC is to promote uniformity in insurance laws and state regulations by 
developing model laws and regulations, as well as regulatory best practices for 
states to base their insurance laws on.120  Additionally, the NAIC Accreditation 
Program certifies states that have demonstrated they meet legal, financial, and 
organizational standards that promote insurance company financial solvency.121 
States are recognizing the need for robust cybersecurity laws, and in 2019 
alone, thirty-one states adopted new or amended cybersecurity-related 
legislation addressing cyber-threat levels for the public and private sectors, as 
well as regulations for the insurance industry.122  Washington, for example, 
responded to a 26 percent rise in cyber breaches between 2017 and 2018 with a 
law expanding the kinds of data breaches that must be reported to affected 
consumers.123  In 2017, the New York Department of Financial Services 
(“NYDFS”) enacted landmark cybersecurity legislation that regulates insurance 
companies along with financial enterprises, requiring among other things 
cybersecurity plans, annual risk assessments, and breach notifications.124  This 
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was followed in 2019 by a bill deeming the failure to provide adequate data 
security a violation of the general business law, subject to civil suit by the State 
Attorney General.125  Other states like Alabama, Mississippi, and New 
Hampshire now have laws requiring cyber events be reported to state insurance 
commissioners.126  These tighter controls and higher penalties translate into a 
higher probability of cyber insurance claims, plus more extensive damages that 
cyber policies could be required to cover.127 
IV. FUTURE TRENDS 
A. It Is Only Going to Get Worse 
Cyberattacks will become more severe, more complex, and more difficult to 
prevent.128  One recent report noted that 78 percent of organizations surveyed 
had suffered network breaches in the previous year,129 and the incidence of 
ransomware attacks and ransomware payments was on the rise.130  In addition, 
analysts predict that collateral damage from large-scale attacks will become 
more and more common.131  Furthermore, with cyberattacks remaining a 
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primary threat, organizations will need to continually assess and address their 
cyber risks and increase spending on cybersecurity measures, such as 
professional risk consultants and cyber insurance policies.132  Intellectual 
property assets will continue to become increasingly critical for organizations, 
leading to more precise valuation, management, and protection of these assets.133  
Despite some statistics showing the likelihood of a massive data breach to be 
potentially as low as one percent, the lifecycle of a breach—the time it takes to 
contain a new breach—has increased, which means costs and expenses related 
to cybersecurity will continue to rise across the board.134 
At the same time, the economic viability of insurance companies is threatened 
by both the likely onslaught of pandemic-related claims, covering everything 
from liability to business interruption coverage, and by the targeting of the same 
insurance companies that insure against large data breaches.135  Insurers will 
choose settlements over costly litigation, and even when they are successful in 
rejecting a claim, it will likely be after costly litigation.136 
B. Insurers Will Try to Mitigate the Damage 
Experts acknowledge the increased spending on cyber insurance policies;137 
but although these policies are profitable, it is a decreasing profitability due in 
part to increased competition in the market.138  The growing number of claims 
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and the increasing size of payouts will likely also contribute to decreasing profit 
margins.139  Although many insurers already assess their prospective client’s 
cyber risk, often requiring they have outside firms audit and strengthen their 
cybersecurity programs,140 insurers will continue to find other ways to lower 
costs in order to stay competitive.141  For example, insurers minimize payouts 
through a variety of methods, such as strict readings of policy language,142 low 
policy limits,143 and lawsuits against third parties that provided the insured with 
IT services.144  Some insurers, such as AIG and Lloyd’s, are simply stating more 
clearly in their policies what types of cyber events are covered.145  However, it 
should be noted that these cost-saving measures can lead to very expensive 
litigation: when there are large claims that have disrupted entire industries, the 
stakes are high and insureds who have been denied coverage will sue their 
insurers, often resulting in equally enormous litigation costs.146 
C. Courts Will Complicate Matters Further 
The growing number of legal battles over cyber insurance coverages will 
increasingly test the viability of the cyber policy.147  Because state laws vary, 
the jurisprudence varies, and even seemingly subtle differences can have a 
significant impact on an organization’s ability to enforce coverage under its 
cyber insurance policy.148  In a 2018 case, for instance, the Court of Appeals for 
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stating in their policies whether or not cyberattacks are covered). 
 146 See Christopher Ott, How Cyber Cases Can Inform COVID-19 Business Litigation, 
LAW360 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257624/how-cyber-cases-can-
inform-covid-19-business-litigation. 
 147 See Reed, supra note 14, at 155. 
 148 See John Bonnie, 11th Circ. Deepens Divide on Ambiguous Insurance Policies, 
LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1229680/11th-circ-deepens-
divide-on-ambiguous-insurance-policies (describing how conflicting interpretations of 
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the Second Circuit held that a loss caused by a spoofing scheme was covered 
under the insurance policy’s computer-fraud provision because computers were 
integral in the scheme’s success.149  The Sixth Circuit agreed and went further 
in an analogous 2018 case by construing all policy exclusions against the 
insurer.150 This is in direct contrast to previous rulings by the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits, which found that the manipulation of computers alone was insufficient 
to cover the losses stemming from the fraud.151 
Differing interpretations happen even within the same circuit, contributing 
further to the confusion for insurers.152  In a 2018 Georgia case, an Eleventh 
Circuit panel narrowly construed proximate cause to find that the insured’s loss 
through a hacker attack did not result directly from computer fraud and thus was 
not covered by the insurance policy.153  In 2019, a different Eleventh Circuit 
panel interpreted proximate cause liberally, holding that the insured’s loss 
“resulted directly from” a phishing email and was thus covered by their policy, 
despite several intervening events that potentially severed the causal chain 
between the email and the loss.154  But perhaps the most closely watched cyber 
insurance litigation at the moment is the Mondelez International case,155 in 
which the snack-food giant is seeking coverage for $100 million in damages 
stemming from a NotPetya attack in 2017.156  Zurich Insurance has denied 
coverage under the hostile-or-warlike exclusion in the policy, while Mondelez 
has focused on the nature or purpose of the attack to claim coverage.157  
Although a broad interpretation of “hostile or war-like act” would allow Zurich 
                                                          
policy language under different state laws has led to “inconsistent guidance to carriers and 
policyholders alike”). 
 149 See Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., Case No. 17-2492, 729 F. App’x 117, 118 
(2d Cir. 2018). 
 150 See Am. Tooling Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 895 F.3d 455, 465 
(6th Cir. 2018). 
 151 See Reed, supra note 14, at 199–200 (describing the rulings in Apache Corp. v. Great 
Am. Ins. Co., 662 F. App’x 252 (5th Cir. 2016) and Pestmaster Servs. v. Travelers Cas. & 
Surety Co. of Am., 656 F. App’x 332 (9th Cir. 2016)). 
 152 See Bonnie, supra note 148 (discussing the recent inconsistent rulings by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Interactive Comms. Int’l, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929 
(11th Cir. 2018) and Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., 944 F.3d 886 (11th 
Cir. 2019)). 
 153 See Interactive Comms. Int’l, Inc., v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 731 F. App’x 929, 935–36 
(11th Cir. 2018). 
 154 Principle Sols. Grp., LLC v. Ironshore Indem., Inc., 944 F.3d 886, 892-93 (11th Cir. 
2019). 
 155 Complaint, Mondelez Int’l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018L011008, 2018 WL 
4941760 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 2018); see Shniderman, supra note 4, at 64-65 (noting that the 
Mondelez case has drawn significant attention from insurance experts and scholars); see 
also Levi, supra note 56 (stating that the Mondelez case is likely to set a precedent for many 
future cases). 
 156 See Levi, supra note 56. 
 157 See Shniderman, supra note 4, at 74. 
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to escape paying out the claim, it could lead to controversial exclusions and gaps 
in coverage that are not reasonably foreseeable by insureds and further confusion 
for insurers and insureds alike.158  Uncertainty over fundamental issues will 
undoubtedly continue to hinder an insurer’s ability to properly assess risk and 
price their insurance policies.159 
V. EVALUATION OF PAST RESPONSES 
A. Application of the Budapest Convention 
Although the Budapest Convention is the model for a transnational definition 
and treatment of cybercrime, some view it as mostly symbolic.160  It has been 
noted that although the signatories recognize the treaty’s provisions, their 
cybercrime laws are nuanced, differing from country to country and exposing 
inconsistencies in jurisdictional as well as substantive matters.161  For example, 
some nations, like the US, explicitly assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
cybercrimes, while other nations, like Iran, assert jurisdiction only when the 
breached data was stored or carried through Iranian telecommunications 
systems.162  An example of a substantive divergence is Article 3 of the Budapest 
Convention on the illegal interception of data.163  Although the convention 
requires the criminalization of an unauthorized interception of data, countries 
like Switzerland further require that the data be “specially secured,” and France 
and Japan penalize intercepting data in transit less harshly than intercepting data 
that is at rest.164 
Another challenge is that some of the sixty-two mostly European signatory 
states have not passed the corresponding domestic legislation, while other 
countries have simply chosen reservations as a way to opt out of certain 
provisions.165  Additionally, one of the most striking issues with the convention 
                                                          
 158 See id. at 74–76 (expanding on the differing meanings of “warlike” or “hostile” act 
and the potential ramifications of the courts interpreting them broadly). 
 159 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (“This uncertainty . . . is important for cyber 
insurers because it directly affects the probability that an insurer will have to pay claims in 
the event of a data breach and this, in turn, affects how they should price their insurance 
policies.”). 
 160 Perloff-Giles, supra note 108, at 217. 
 161 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 26–29 (stating that many of the Budapest signatories 
had issued reservations on substantive or jurisdictional points, or sometimes even both). 
 162 See id. at 28. 
 163 See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 107, at art. III. 
 164 Corcoran, supra note 107, at 37–38. 
 165 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 17–18 (explaining that many of the sixty-two 
ratifying states have claimed reservations); see also Perloff-Giles, supra note 108, at 217 
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is the noticeable absence of top cyber power countries known for sponsoring and 
even promulgating cross-border cyberattacks, such as China, Russia, and Iran.166  
Thus, while the convention remains an important step toward international 
consensus, it fails to reflect the full scope of global cyber threats and cybercrime 
laws, and it provides insurance companies only a limited view of the future to 
work with.167 
B. The Response Back Home 
1. Federal Response 
The CFAA has been beleaguered since its inception by its doctrinal 
limitations and confusing core provisions.168  For example, two of the law’s key 
terms, “without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access,” were never 
expressly defined, leaving courts to struggle with both vagueness concerns and 
the undesirable blending of civil, contract, and criminal law principles.169  In 
addition, many experts feel the current cyberthreat environment, where malware 
can spread and cause devastating destruction at lightning speed, calls for 
proactive approaches that would potentially run afoul of the CFAA.170  
Moreover, some malware activities may not fall under the federal statutes that 
would grant an attorney general the authority to disrupt the infected network, a 
consequence of federal laws failing to keep up with fast-evolving cybercrime 
methods.171  Thus, insurers cannot realistically look to current federal laws to 
curb cybercrime, reduce their insured’s exposure, or provide guidance on how 
                                                          
(noting that some of the signatory states have failed to enact domestic laws reflecting the 
Convention’s provisions). 
 166 See Perloff-Giles, supra note 108, at 217 (listing some of the countries who refuse to 
join the Budapest Convention, including Russia and China); see also Shannon Vavra, The 
World’s Top Cyber Powers, AXIOS (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.axios.com/the-worlds-top-
cyber-powers-1513304669-4fa53675-b7e6-4276-a2bf-4a84b4986fe9.html (discussing the 
nation-states considered cyber powers due to their hacking capabilities, including Russia, 
China, and Iran). 
 167 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 17–18 (explaining that several factors prevent the 
Budapest Convention from providing a good view of the future of cybercrime). 
 168 Andrea M. Matwyshyn & Stephanie K. Pell, Broken, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 479, 
481–82 (2020). 
 169 Id. at 484. 
 170 See Corcoran, supra note 107, at 7; see also Matwyshyn & Pell, supra note 168, at 
502. 
 171 See Matwyshyn & Pell, supra note 168, at 502–03 (giving the example of botnets, 
which are a type of malware that steal data from infected networks; in some cases, the data 
harvesting does not involve activities deemed illegal under federal statutes and thus 
prosecutors may not be able to seek an injunction to take them down). 
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courts should view insurer responsibility.172 
2. State Response 
Although the states have stepped in to fill in gaps caused by outdated federal 
laws, a state-centric approach to cybersecurity laws has proven to be impractical 
because most laws do not do enough to address current risks or regulate and 
deter inferior cybersecurity practices.173  For instance, New York’s Stop Hacks 
and Improve Electronic Data Security Act (“SHIELD”) imposes a limited 
number of data security requirements, and the 2017 New York Department of 
Financial Services (“NYDFS”) law requiring companies to maintain adequate 
cybersecurity measures only applies to financial institutions.174  Although some 
states have enacted legislation requiring measures such as the creation of task 
forces, the implementation of cybersecurity programs, and the notification of 
data breaches, these laws can vary greatly in degree and scope.175  This 
inconsistency makes it difficult for insurers to adequately gauge their risk to 
properly price their policies.176 
The inconsistencies extend to insurance regulations as well.  Recognizing the 
amount of sensitive data insurance companies handle and their own risk of a 
cyberattack, some states have adopted versions of the NAIC’s Data Security 
                                                          
 172 See Stretched Beyond the Breaking Point: The CFAA and iPhone Batteries, MICH. 
TECH. L. REV., https://mttlr.org/2019/09/stretched-beyond-the-breaking-point-the-cfaa-and-
iphone-batteries/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2021) (describing the CFAA’s primary shortcomings 
which make it a “blunt and volatile instrument, subject to significant differences in 
interpretation by prosecutors, judges, and civil attorneys. . .”).  The broad and vague 
language of the statute captures everyday activities not intended for coverage, and leaves out 
potentially criminal actions, making it difficult for modern technology users and developers 
to know when their activity falls under the CFAA.  Id.  See also Corcoran, supra note 107, 
at 8–9 (discussing the current issue of vagueness and confusion of the defense strategy 
around the world and how this affects the US). 
 173 See Jeff Kosseff, Hamiltonian Cybersecurity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 159 
(2019). 
 174 See Cynthia Brumfield, 12 New State Privacy and Security Laws Explained: Is Your 
Business Ready?, CSO (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3429608/11-
new-state-privacy-and-security-laws-explained-is-your-business-ready.html. 
 175 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2019, supra note 122.  NCSL lists state laws passed in 
2019 that address cybersecurity concerns, such as FL H 5301 Ch. 2019–118 (creating the 
Florida Cybersecurity Task Force and requiring an experienced state chief information 
security officer), GA H 30 Ch. 3 (funding a Georgia center that promotes enhanced 
cybersecurity technology for the private and public sectors), and ND H 1048 Ch. 469 
(requiring North Dakota to conduct state research and development of technologies to 
protect against data breaches and identify hacking threats).  Id. 
 176 See Meadow Clendenin, “No Concessions” With No Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom 
Insurers and Insureds Are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 741, 
743 (2006). 
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Model Law, which requires that insurers comply with specific cybersecurity 
measures.177 However, most other states have not yet followed suit, further 
highlighting the lack of national standards for insurers to follow. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES AND SOLUTIONS 
Over the years there have been several proposals for shoring up the cyber 
insurance industry so that it may be better positioned to respond to the increasing 
threat of cyberattacks.  Some experts contend that the federal government should 
be the insurer’s reinsurance and step in to cover losses over threshold amounts 
in extreme and specific situations.178  Other analysts call for the creation of a 
national framework to oversee all cybersecurity matters involving national 
security, including a federal oversight agency and a national security court to 
handle insurance coverage disputes arising out of cyber breaches.179  Still, others 
believe that more clarity in policy language, combined with educating 
policyholders on properly assessing their risk and choosing the appropriate 
coverages, will mean more coverage for losses and fewer legal disputes.180  
These are, however, generally reactive approaches to cyber threats; a proactive 
approach will be the way to ensure the survival of the cyber policy.181 
                                                          
 177 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Licensed by Your State’s Insurance Commissioner? 
Comprehensive Data Security Requirements Are Headed Your Way, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 9, 
2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/licensed-your-state-s-insurance-
commissioner-comprehensive-data-security (listing the states that as of 2019 had passed a 
new Insurance Data Security Law modeled after the NAIC’s: South Carolina, Ohio, 
Michigan, Alabama, Delaware, Connecticut, Mississippi, and New Hampshire); see also 
Cyber Security Legislation 2020, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 13, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ 
cybersecurity-legislation-2020.aspx (noting that Indiana, Maine, and Virginia had adopted 
versions of the NAIC’s model law as of Apr. 27, 2020). 
 178 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 237; see also Vicevich, supra note 8, at 597–
98. 
 179 See Scott J. Shackelford & Austin E. Brady, Is It Time for a National Cybersecurity 
Safety Board? Examining the Policy Implications and Political Pushback, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. 
& TECH. 56, 57–58 (2018) (“[T]here has been a growing chorus of calls to establish an 
analogue of the NTSB to investigate cyberattacks.”); see also Shniderman, supra note 4, at 
76 (suggesting several ways to address the Hostile or War-like Action exclusion, including 
creating a government body to attribute cyberattacks, and creating a national security court 
to hear insurance coverage disputes). 
 180 See Patrick Cordova & Caroline Meneau, 11th Circ. Insurance Ruling Views 
Cybercrime Realistically, LAW360 (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
1236933/11th-circ-insurance-ruling-views-cybercrime-realistically (contending that cyber 
insurance customers should review their policy provisions to ensure they adequately cover 
different kinds of cyberattacks); see also DAC Beachcroft, supra note 94 (explaining that in 
July 2019, Lloyd’s of London began requiring clarity in its policies as to cyber-exposure 
coverages, demonstrating that clearer policy language needed to be prioritized). 
 181 See DAC Beachcroft, supra note 94 (explaining that approaches to cyber threats 
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A. The Regulatory Solution Must Be a Federal One 
Traditionally, insurance laws have fallen within the purview of the states.182  
However, Congress has periodically exercised its commerce power to enact 
critical legislation, such as the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, which 
made flood insurance available for the first time,183 and the Flood Disaster 
Protection Act of 1973, which required certain types of properties located in 
Special Flood Hazard Areas to purchase flood insurance.184  Because insurers 
and most of their clients operate across state lines, there is a clear need for 
comprehensive data security legislation to protect critical systems, business 
networks, and the privacy rights of individuals so that damages incurred by 
security breaches never exceed an insurer’s capacity to reimburse its insured.185 
While interstate compacts and model laws such as the NAIC’s Data Security 
Model Law can provide a unifying set of new regulations, their adoption is not 
only voluntary, but the process is also often slow moving despite prompting by 
the federal government.186 Additionally, when adopting a model law, each state 
                                                          
similar to the Prudential Regulation Authority may be taken by insurance companies 
because cyber risks are always evolving). 
 182 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, NAT’L ASSOC. OF INS. COMM’RS,  https://content.naic. 
org/cipr_topics/topic_mccarran_ferguson_act.htm (last updated May 5, 2020) (explaining 
that insurance regulation has historically been up to the states; despite the 1944 Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. South‐Eastern Underwriters Association which concluded 
insurance was interstate commerce and thus within the purview of Congress, Congress has 
since reaffirmed the delegation of authority to the states with respect to the regulation and 
taxation of the insurance industry). 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (2020). 
 184 § 4012(a). 
 185 See Kosseff, supra note 173, at 170 (explaining that cybersecurity laws protect the 
integrity and availability of data, systems, and networks, in order to protect human rights, 
economic interests, and national security); see also Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 
(discussing how insurer Penn Treaty became insolvent after inadequately pricing a new line 
of business based on their experience with other products); Matthew A. Schwartz & Corey 
Omer, The Constitutionality of State Cybersecurity Regulations, THE CLEARING HOUSE, 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q2-banking-
perspectives/articles/constitutionality-cybersecurity-regulations (last visited Feb. 24, 2021) 
(arguing that the appropriate approach to cybersecurity measures is comprehensive federal 
guidelines or frameworks as opposed to a state-by-state approach). 
 186 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2020, supra note 177 (noting that Indiana, Maine, and 
Virginia had adopted versions of the NAIC’s model law and listing three states that adopted 
the NAIC’s model law in 2020, bringing the total number of states to eleven as of Apr. 27, 
2020); see also State Legislative Brief: NAIC Data Security Model Law, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMM’RS & CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y RES. (Dec. 2019), https://www.naic.org/documents/ 
cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_data_security_model_law.pdf (noting that the NAIC model 
law became effective in October of 2017); NAIC Insurance Data Security Model Law 
Update, SEC. COMPLIANCE ASSOC., https://www.scasecurity.com/naic-insurance-data-
security-model-law-update/ (last updated Sept. 2020) (explaining that the federal 
government expects complete adoption of the NAIC model law within five years, otherwise 
2020] Cyber Insurance Today 137 
crafts legislation that is often a nuanced version of the model law, undermining 
the attempt at uniformity.187  These variations in state cybersecurity and data 
protection laws could also lead to claims that the laws are in violation of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause if they appear to be regulating out-of-state activities, 
unduly burdening interstate commerce, or subjecting entities to inconsistent 
regulations.188  Finally, despite insurance law traditionally being state law, cyber 
insurance coverage disputes are almost always litigated in federal courts.189  In 
this situation, therefore, Congress can provide the most effective solution by 
passing federal guidelines addressing key cybersecurity and cyber insurance 
concerns.190 
B. New Regulations for Insureds 
1. Organizations Must Reduce Their Cyber Risk 
Any federal law must begin by requiring businesses to have cybersecurity 
programs in place that include proven cyber defenses such as encryption, data 
loss prevention, and employee training, which have been found to significantly 
reduce data breach costs.191  Cybersecurity programs should also be required to 
include basic—but essential—data security practices, such as patching, 
updating,192 and other maintenance conditions that are critical to successfully 
preventing security breaches.193  In addition, people-based attacks, such as 
                                                          
Congress could enact legislation setting uniform requirements for insurance data security). 
 187 See Lazzarotti, supra note 177 (detailing some of the significant differences between 
the NAIC model law and the corresponding state laws). 
 188 Kosseff, supra note 173, at 192–93 (“[S]tate cybersecurity regulations are likely to 
face Dormant Commerce Clause challenges . . .”); see Schwartz & Omer, supra note 185 
(“Whether state regulations of financial services institutions’ cybersecurity programs pass 
muster under the dormant Commerce Clause is an open question that will be answered as 
the regulatory regimes are developed.”). 
 189 See Brian Fullmer, Digital Risk & Ambiguity in Insurance: Tension Between Party 
Intent & Risk-Shifting, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 285 n.59 (2020). 
 190 See Kosseff, supra note 173, at 159 (“A uniform federal system of cybersecurity laws 
. . . would be more effective at achieving the end goals of bolstering the security of systems 
and information.”); see also Schwartz & Omer, supra note 185 (“Cybersecurity . . . requires 
serious consideration of a national solution.”). 
 191 See Kosseff, supra note 173, at 188. 
 192 See Vicevich, supra note 8, at 573 (suggesting effective cybersecurity measures such 
as patching and updating should be required under law). 
 193 See Elizabeth Snell, $2M Settlement Reached in Cottage Health Data Breach Case, 
HEALTH IT SECURITY (Nov. 27, 2017), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/2m-settlement-
reached-in-cottage-health-data-breach-case (detailing the case of California hospital system 
Cottage Health: after a data breach in 2013 exposed their inadequate security practices, such 
as using outdated and unpatched software, Cottage Health was fined $2 million dollars in 
2015 for failing to correct those practices, leading to a second data breach). 
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spoofing and phishing, can be thwarted by mandatory security awareness 
training, as well as policies requiring live-person validation for requests 
involving money or access.194  With these types of attacks on the rise, 
organizations must strive to develop a proactive culture focused on prevention, 
rather than a reactive culture focused on recovery through cyber insurance.195 
Despite the added cost, organizations should view an effective cybersecurity 
program as an important investment because it can significantly limit their 
losses, as well as the damage to their reputation, which is not covered by cyber 
insurance.196  Moreover, the federal government could subsidize this 
requirement through tax incentives, providing credits for the implementation of 
a cybersecurity program, and setting out a gradual reduction of subsidies over a 
specified time period as market forces bring the costs down.197  The government 
might even offer additional tax credits for standalone cyber policies.198  Certain 
categories of nonprofit businesses that are frequently targeted by ransomware 
attackers, such as those handling vitally important data (i.e., hospitals) and time-
sensitive government benefits (i.e., state unemployment agencies),199 would 
receive higher subsidies to offset the costs of maintaining a strong cybersecurity 
plan.200  Much like the national flood disaster regulations of the sixties and 
seventies, these federally subsidized cybersecurity programs could today 
                                                          
 194 See Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 24–29 (stating that training and education are 
necessary to reinforce safe cyber behavior); see also Stu Sjouwerman, It Only Takes One 
Phish: Puerto Rico Gets Scammed Out of $2.6 Million, KNOWBE4: SEC. AWARENESS 
TRAINING BLOG (Feb. 14, 2019), https://blog.knowbe4.com/it-only-takes-one-phish-puerto-
rico-gets-scammed-out-of-2.6-million (contending that companies should establish policies 
requiring cyber requests be validated by an alternative medium like a phone call). 
 195 See Bissell et al., supra note 1, at 27 (explaining that to strengthen cybersecurity, 
there must be greater emphasis on “nurturing a security-first culture”); Vicevich, supra note 
8, at 573 (suggesting that the current cybersecurity laws are “overly reactive” in nature, one 
of the reasons for their ineffectiveness). 
 196 See GUIORA, supra note 12, at 73; Reed, supra note 14, at 164 (noting that 
reputational damage to a company can lead to decreased profits and sales and drops in stock 
prices). 
 197 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 246 (suggesting that, similar to the NFIP and 
the flood insurance requirement, government subsidies could support a cyber insurance 
requirement as the market grows); Schoenberg, supra note 127 (explaining that newcomers 
to the cyber insurance market will likely seek ways to offer lower premiums in order to 
compete and limit risk at the same time). 
 198 See Levi, supra note 56 (describing that due to the complicated nature of 
cybersecurity, a dedicated cyber insurance policy is better than cyber coverage bundled into 
a package policy). 
 199 See Atkins, supra note 89. 
 200 See Andrew Rinaldi, The Cost of Cybersecurity and How to Budget for It, 
BUSINESS.COM (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.business.com/articles/smb-budget-for-
cybersecurity/ (describing cybersecurity costs as an amount equal to 5.6 to 20 percent of a 
company’s total IT budget). 
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prevent an unpredictable amount of damage, including billions of dollars in 
losses and countless violations of individuals’ privacy rights.201 
2. Reporting is Key 
Legislators, insurance experts, and researchers agree that insurance 
companies cannot properly assess the actual cost of cyberattacks when 
organizations that have experienced a breach are unwilling to share their 
information.202  A federal law mandating that all cyber incidents be reported will 
provide insurers with real data they can use to assess their risk and calculate 
policy coverages and prices.203  Additionally, government agencies and the 
business sector will benefit from a more accurate picture of the cyberthreat 
landscape and will use the data to learn about, understand, and avoid similar 
attacks.204  Organizations undoubtedly have real concerns when it comes to their 
privacy, security, and reputation, meaning they need to be encouraged to share 
their information;205 however, this could be dealt with in the same way court 
records and proceedings are sealed, depending on the circumstances.206  Thus, 
requiring organizations to have cybersecurity measures and report cyber 
incidents is not only advisable, it will be key to ensuring the survival of cyber 
                                                          
 201 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 83, at 243 (noting that federal flood disaster laws are 
credited with successfully preventing billions of dollars in damages and federal expenditures 
and providing millions of people with protection for their properties); see also Granato & 
Polacek, supra note 5 (suggesting that improved cybersecurity rules and practices could 
potentially help businesses avoid the kinds of catastrophic cyberattacks that later result in 
exceedingly high insurance claims). 
 202 See Reed, supra note 14, at 161 (citing reputational concerns); Vicevich, supra note 
8, at 594 (citing liability concerns). 
 203 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (indicating the lack of historical data as one of 
the challenges the cyber insurance market faces); Vicevich, supra note 8, at 577 (contending 
that information sharing assists insurers in their premium calculations); but see Wolff, supra 
note 83 (arguing for a requirement that insurers report on the correlations between their 
cyber products and claims data). 
 204 See Marc Barrachin & Algirde Pipikaite, We Need a Global Standard for Reporting 
Cyber Attacks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/we-need-a-global-
standard-for-reporting-cyber-attacks (arguing for information sharing so that organizations 
can prepare for similar attacks and correct discovered vulnerabilities, and so that regulators 
and law enforcement can shape adequate cybersecurity governance, data collection, and 
information sharing). 
 205 See Dan Swinhoe, Why Businesses Don’t Report Cybercrimes to Law Enforcement, 
CSO (May 30, 2019), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3398700/why-businesses-don-t-
report-cybercrimes-to-law-enforcement.html (suggesting that businesses are reluctant to 
report because they don’t see a point and law enforcement is unlikely to help). 
 206 See Robert Timothy Reagan, Sealing Court Records and Proceedings: A Pocket 
Guide, FED. JUD.  CTR., at 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.fjc.gov/content/sealing-court-
records-and-proceedings-pocket-guide-0 (explaining generally how and why some court 
records and proceedings are sealed from the public). 
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insurance.207 
C. New Regulations for Insurers 
1. Cyber Policy Language Must Be Standardized 
The next focus for any federal law attempting to address the ability of insurers 
to cover cyber risks is a requirement for standardized policy language.208  
Providing standardized expectations for coverages will have two important 
effects.  First, it will incentivize the purchase of proper coverage by providing 
uniform standards that establish legal definitions for important terms and federal 
guidelines on standalone and package policy coverages.209  Many companies 
seek cyber coverage through their commercial general liability policies, which 
frequently contain exclusions and limitations that lead to confusion and disputes 
over coverages and exemptions.210  Standardized language and coverages will 
help buyers understand exactly what is covered so that they can choose an 
adequate policy for their level of cyber risk.211 
A federal standard would additionally rein in, and potentially curtail, the 
increasing amount of litigation over coverage disputes.212  As previously 
discussed, the differing interpretations of key policy language are giving rise to 
                                                          
 207 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (“Better modeling of cyberattacks should help 
insurers measure their accumulation of interrelated risks, and improved cybersecurity 
standards and practices may help businesses avoid such catastrophic attacks to begin 
with.”). 
 208 See SEAMAN & SCHULZE, supra note 13 (explaining that there is no standard policy 
forms and terms and that language varies from insurer to insurer and even policy to policy). 
 209 Id. (explaining that the lack of standard cyber risk policy language leads to confusion 
over coverages; for example, under some policies, data breach losses may include breach 
notification and forensic repair costs, while other policies might not cover these losses).  See 
Levi, supra note 56 (discussing how insureds often choose insufficient coverage due to the 
confusing language in cyber policies and explains the improvements made to related 
language). 
 210 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (noting that buyer uncertainty about what a 
cyber policy covers is one of the challenges the cyber insurance market is facing); Reed, 
supra note 14, at 177 (noting that commercial general liability policies contain exclusions 
that can be read to exclude losses stemming from cyber events, such as losses due to 
intentional attacks, or damage caused to intangible property like computer software). 
 211 See Granato & Polacek, supra note 5 (noting that some business may overestimate 
the amount of coverage they have for cyberattacks due to the restrictive nature of some 
policies that is reflected in their policies). 
 212 See id. (“Insurance companies are already beginning to write cyber insurance 
contracts that more explicitly define what is or is not covered, and this trend should help 
limit lawsuits and disputes over cyber coverage.”). 
2020] Cyber Insurance Today 141 
lawsuits across the nation.213  Consequently, analysts are pointing to cases such 
as Mondelez as a litmus test for the future of cyber insurance coverage.214  A 
federal law providing narrow guidelines and standardized policies will likely 
curb the number of court battles, harmonize jurisprudence, and reduce litigation 
costs, which in turn will help support the stability of the cyber insurance 
market.215 
2. The Insurer Must Also Take Action (the Carrot and Stick) 
The growing cybersecurity threat is too great and too complex for an easy 
government fix.216  To better secure their financial positions in preparation for 
the next big attack and subsequent claims, insurance companies will need to sell 
more cyber policies while encouraging customers to properly assess and insure 
their risk.217  Companies that have already invested in a cybersecurity plan may 
not see the value in purchasing more cyber coverage than that already included 
in their general policy.218  However, insurance companies take advantage of their 
relationship with their insureds to provide them with risk management services 
aimed at preventing, detecting, and effectively responding to data breaches, 
thereby reducing the number of claims and containing the economic damage.219  
Insurers use this tool to understand their own risk exposure as well as their 
client’s risk.220  Thus, they will need to employ a carrot-and-stick approach in 
order to bring in new clients and premiums, encourage customers to employ best 
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security practices, and restructure existing portfolios to better meet their 
insured’s actual cyber risk.221 
The clearest incentive for any organization will be a monetary one.  Insurance 
companies need to tap into their profit margins to encourage organizations to 
implement appropriate security-first practices.222  Insurers generally evaluate a 
potential customer’s cyber resilience prior to issuing a policy so that they are in 
a position to nudge the customer toward better risk management.223  For 
example, insurers could give discounts based on how robust their insured’s 
cybersecurity plan is.224  Credits could be given for practices such as: employing 
technologies that assist in the rapid detection and containment of a data 
breach,225 extensive use of data encryption,226 and training and testing of 
employees.227  Higher-risk policies could come with incentives to implement or 
improve security measures, especially for small to medium-sized businesses, 
which might be excluded from a mandatory cybersecurity plan requirement 
under a federal regulation.228  Much like auto insurers give discounts to drivers 
who remain accident-free,229 cyber insurers could offer recurring discounts to 
customers with cybersecurity programs that remain incident-free or that meet 
other security goals the insurer sets.230  Insurers who fail to offer meaningful 
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discounts understand they are competing with other providers and will adjust 
accordingly.  This “carrot” approach will likely cut into insurers’ profitability, 
but any reductions will be offset by increased premiums: new customers 
purchasing cyber coverage and existing customers upgrading their current 
policies.231 And the company behavior these discounts incentivize should help 
control and even curtail the frequency and impact of successful cyberattacks.232 
A “stick” approach to cyber insurance will also be necessary to influence how 
organizations address their risk.233  Rather than deny coverage post-cyber event, 
insurers will need to determine which of their current or potential customers 
require specific cyber coverage and then refuse to write their policy unless it 
includes that coverage.234  During the underwriting process, insurers typically 
evaluate the client’s security posture, make recommendations for coverages, and 
set the premiums.235  For example, if it is determined that due to the nature of 
the client’s business their cyber policy must be standalone and include certain 
maintenance conditions, then the insurer will refuse to write a lesser policy.236  
Although some organizations will accept the terms thanks to their newfound 
respect for cybersecurity threats, others will turn to the growing market for 
alternative solutions.237  Insurers can work with clients to adjust other policy 
coverages in order to keep the required cyber coverage, contractually obligate 
the client to eventually convert to the target coverage, or threaten cancellation 
altogether.  Requiring more robust cyber coverage and spreading it across a 
growing field of insurance providers can mitigate risk for the insurers and ensure 
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the viability of their cyber insurance policies.238 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Society’s dependence on computer technology has brought us to this 
inevitable present, where cyber criminals seem to have an ever-evolving ability 
to wreak havoc on our lives.  Cyber insurance is meant to help victims recover 
their losses from a cyberattack, but as the attacks have grown in size and 
frequency, they have led to higher claims payouts as well as uncertainties in 
coverages that have led to very costly legal disputes.  This in turn has set the 
cyber insurance market on a perilous path to insolvency. 
Because it is increasingly difficult to treat cybersecurity on a state-by-state 
basis, the solution to this dilemma must be a federal one. The government must 
pass federal regulations requiring public and private sector organizations to have 
cybersecurity plans and report cyber incidents. Additionally, the new regulations 
must require standardized cyber insurance policy language. Finally, insurers 
must make cyber insurance more attractive through monetary discounts and 
exercise a bit of tough love in requiring that their insureds purchase coverages 
specific to their actual cyber risk as determined by the insurer’s assessment. 
These measures are the best way for the cyber insurance industry to achieve 
stability and viability so that it may continue to serve as the safety net it is 
intended to be instead of a security ring against cyberattacks. 
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